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The global crisis and financial intermediation in  
emerging market economies: an overview
1 
Introduction 
Emerging market economies (EMEs) were significantly affected by the global financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, compared with their experience in previous crises, EMEs displayed 
remarkable resilience, maintaining robust rates of growth even as the crisis unfolded in 
advanced economies starting around mid-2007, and containing disruptions to financial 
markets so as to avoid experiencing crises themselves. The peak period of stress in EME 
financial markets was also comparatively limited, with severe pressures in the aftermath of 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in mid-September 2008, and improved stability and signs of 
recovery starting around the second quarter of 2009. Since then, EMEs have outperformed 
advanced economies, both in terms of economic growth and in asset price valuations. 
On 28–29 January 2010, senior central bank officials from EMEs met at the BIS in Basel to 
discuss the impact of the international crisis on emerging market economies and how 
policymakers had responded. This overview draws on that discussion, which highlighted four 
topics: (i) capital flows and cross-border lending; (ii) financial intermediation in EMEs during 
the crisis: home-owned versus foreign-owned banks; (iii) the impact of the crisis on local 
money and debt markets; and (iv) central bank instruments in response to the crisis.  
1.  Capital flows and cross-border lending 
A key feature of financial crises in EMEs in the 1980s and 1990s was a “sudden stop” or 
reversal of capital inflows.
2 The most recent crisis also saw a sharp reduction in gross capital 
inflows to EMEs. However, there were important differences from past crises. On the one 
hand, EMEs were much stronger than in previous episodes of capital inflow reversals. For 
example, net financing requirements were lower in many EMEs because current accounts 
were in surplus or balanced (Graph 1). 
On the other hand, policies in the EMEs could do little to counter capital flow reversals 
caused by the crisis in the advanced financial markets. In particular, the sharp declines in 
cross-border bank lending in the most recent crisis reflected weaknesses in the capital and 
liquidity positions of major international banks that prompted them to deleverage and reduce 
financing. This is consistent with the evidence of Takáts (2010) that supply factors played a 
dominant role in the reduction in cross-border lending in the fourth quarter of 2008.
3 One 
implication was that EME policy responses, such as large increases in interest rates, would 
have had little effect in attracting cross-border lending until global financing conditions had 
stabilised.
4 During the meeting, concerns were also expressed that advanced economies 
                                                  
1   This overview chapter was prepared by Ramon Moreno based on contributions by Dubravko Mihaljek, Előd 
Takáts and Agustín Villar. Comments by Philip Turner are gratefully acknowledged. 
2   See BIS (2009) pp 8–12 for a historical overview. 
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might adopt policies supporting financing in their own economies, which could restrict flows 
to emerging market economies and might imply a need for policy coordination. 
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1 Quarterly sums across Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey.  
Source: IMF IFS; national data. 
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, capital flows to EMEs recovered relatively quickly. First, net 
and gross capital flows to EMEs rebounded starting around the second quarter of 2009 after 
declining sharply in the last quarter of 2008 (Graph 1, left-hand and middle panels) indicating 
an early recovery in foreign investor interest in EMEs. Second, gross capital outflows appear 
to have played a stabilising role (Graph 1, right-hand panel). They declined in late 2008 and 
in early 2009, partly counteracting the reduction in gross capital inflows. This contributed to 
the recovery observed in net capital flows to EMEs in 2009.  
2.  Bank intermediation: home-owned versus foreign-owned banks
5 
The financial stress caused by the crisis affected bank intermediation in emerging market 
economies. During the meeting, three aspects were discussed: (i) changes in bank business 
models (including funding, lending and liquidity operations); (ii) how foreign-owned banks’ 
responses compared with those of home-owned banks; and (iii) securitisation in EMEs since 
the crisis.  
                                                                                                                                                      
4    For further discussion of cross-border flows, see the contributions by Central Bank of Argentina (2010), 
Babicky (2010) or South African Reserve Bank (2010). Ong (2010) discusses the risks associated with cross-
border financial intermediation. 
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Changes in business models 
EME banks by and large adjusted to the crisis in ways that stabilised their financial positions. 
On the funding side, they reduced reliance on wholesale markets and sought to attract retail 
deposits. On the lending side, banks lowered the growth of new lending to firms and 
households, shifted towards less risky loans and increased their holdings of government 
bonds. In an effort to boost liquidity, banks shortened the maturity of their assets, relied less 
on the interbank market and increased their transactions with central banks.
6  
A particular concern was foreign currency lending to households, which was widespread in 
some central and eastern European countries. At the macroeconomic level, this type of 
lending was encouraged by the trend appreciation of local currencies, relatively low 
exchange rate volatility, and high domestic interest rates in some countries. Some 
participants thought that flexible exchange rates were the best tool to limit the spread of 
foreign currency lending.  
At the microeconomic level, foreign banks undertook foreign currency lending to increase 
their competitiveness in local banking markets, thus helping to lower financing costs in an 
expanding market. That is, such lending did not reflect the traditional currency substitution 
due to macroeconomic instability.  
However, there was a certain lack of appreciation by banks of the large currency mismatch 
risks that borrowers had assumed (ie debts were in foreign currency but income was in local 
currency). In some cases, controlling the expansion of foreign currency lending was more 
difficult because views differed on how best to address this issue. However, with the crisis, a 
consensus in favour of limiting foreign currency lending has emerged.  
Role of foreign-owned banks
7 
Some meeting participants reported that foreign and domestically-owned banks adjusted to 
the crisis (in terms of their funding, lending and liquidity operations) more or less in the same 
way. Nevertheless, there were some important differences in foreign-owned bank behaviour 
across EMEs. First, foreign bank subsidiaries in some EMEs funded their parent banks 
during the crisis, apparently to strengthen the liquidity and overall financial position of parent 
banks. This raised concerns in some countries where foreign exchange markets were under 
pressure, although parent banks with subsidiaries in central Europe used some of this 
funding to support subsidiaries in crisis-affected countries in the region. There were also 
other examples of parents providing support to their subsidiaries in EMEs.  
Second, in a number of countries foreign bank participation in domestic interbank or credit 
markets was affected. For example, foreign banks in one EME – apparently on instructions 
from their parent banks – withdrew earlier than domestic banks from the interbank market at 
the height of the crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008, preferring to deal with the central bank 
rather than with other commercial banks. As for credit, BIS statistics show that lending by the 
local affiliates of foreign banks denominated in domestic currency was remarkably stable 
during the crisis.
8 However, in a number of EMEs, including large economies like China and 
Brazil, foreign bank credit growth lagged behind that of domestic banks after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy. Foreign banks also scaled back credit to certain sectors (eg consumer 
lending). 
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A number of explanations were offered for differences in foreign bank behaviour. One was 
the nature of the funding model.
9 It was suggested that the behaviour of foreign banks that 
relied on retail deposits for funding was very similar to that of domestic banks during the 
crisis. The financial condition of the parent was also important. In one EME, headquarters 
financial support was received by a subsidiary of a bank whose parent was weathering the 
crisis well, but not by a subsidiary of a bank (headquartered in another country) whose 
parent had been much more severely affected. In another EME, smaller foreign-owned 
banks whose parents were more exposed to the global financial turmoil were cut off from 
head office funding and had to reduce their exposures to the corporate sector. Still another 
explanation was the strategic importance of the market. For example, a number of 
EU-headquartered banks consider central and eastern Europe part of their core market, 
which creates a strong incentive to maintain a presence, even in the face of significant 
stress. 
Recent experience has also prompted a reassessment of the relative merits of foreign 
branch banking. From the perspective of EMEs, foreign bank branches were traditionally 
seen as providing greater incentive to foreign banks to transfer know-how and technology to 
EMEs. With the crisis, however, subsidiaries came to appear more attractive for EMEs 
because their assets can be ring-fenced and they can be regulated more tightly than 
branches in some jurisdictions, ensuring that they maintain a stronger financial position (eg 
adequate capital). Another reason is that subsidiaries, which tend to lend and fund in the 
local market, are thought to signal greater commitment.  
While a number of EMEs favoured a foreign bank subsidiary approach (even in those cases 
where foreign bank branches are currently dominant), others still saw a role for branches. 
One participant reported a reluctance to give foreign-owned banks dominance over some 
market segments, which could happen if they were granted full national treatment as 
subsidiaries. It was also noted that with appropriate legislation, depositors of branches could 
be protected just as well as depositors of subsidiaries.  
Foreign banks themselves also face trade-offs in choosing between entering EME markets 
as branches or subsidiaries. On the one hand, reputation risks are the same whether 
affiliates operate as branches or subsidiaries, and increased regulation of subsidiaries can 
impose costs. By these criteria, foreign banks might prefer to set up branches. On the other 
hand, subsidiaries might have a greater capacity to expand in a rapidly growing market, 
implying greater profit opportunities. 
Securitisation 
In most EMEs, securitisation of domestic bank loans was not widespread before the crisis,
10 
but it was present in a number of countries (eg Brazil, China and India). Participants’ views 
differed on the merits of encouraging further securitisation. In one case, authorities sought to 
set up a legal and regulatory framework so as to prevent banks from resorting to potentially 
risky unregulated or “informal” securitisation. In another case, authorities were concerned 
that securitisation would further stimulate already rapid (double digit) bank lending, and 
consequently took no steps to encourage it by providing a legal framework.  
                                                  
9   How international banks changed their funding patterns is explored in some detail in BIS (2010). 
10   For emerging market economies, securitisation has traditionally been a way to reduce the cost of cross-border 
financing. Risk mitigation for “future flow” securitisation (eg by backing the instrument by revenues collected 
offshore) has been effective; at least one rating agency reports that for this type of securitisation, the default 
rate is low compared to the typical rating (BBB) assigned. BIS Papers No 54  5
 
 
3.   Impact of the crisis on emerging financial markets
11 
The crisis affected liquidity in various segments of EME foreign exchange (FX) markets 
(spot, forward, swaps etc) and in domestic financial markets.  
Effects on EME forex markets
12 
The effects of the crisis on forex markets appeared to vary across EMEs, although in general 
both spot and foreign exchange swap markets experienced a tightening in financing 
conditions. This resulted in a reduction in the number of intermediaries active in the 
marketplace, as well as shorter maturities in some FX derivative markets, including the 
cessation of longer-maturity (five- to seven-year) FX swap deals. Another result was 
improvements in the documentation of transactions, more stringent collateral requirements 
for swap transactions and the migration of derivatives to exchanges, all of which helped 
reduce the outstanding notional amounts and possibly reduced risk. In some countries where 
derivatives markets are small, their contraction was not seen as a major source of concern.  
A number of factors influenced the scale and duration of the impact on foreign exchange 
markets. Possibly the most important were external factors, particularly the financial position 
of parent banks (which in some cases led to cutbacks in limits that the headquarters applied 
to their EME subsidiaries’ FX positions) and changes in global investor sentiment or risk 
aversion (eg the normalisation of one FX swap market was attributed to the improvement in 
government bond prices).  
The degree of financial integration and deepening also played a role. For example, the 
effects of the crisis on less developed forward markets in some Asian countries appear to 
have been smaller than in more developed markets. The reasons why different segments of 
the FX markets developed in different countries are not clear and could be idiosyncratic 
(eg specialisation of traders who first established the market). 
Finally, and as discussed further below, policy responses were also important, notably the 
availability of foreign reserves, foreign central bank swap or repo facilities, or IMF financing.  
Effects on domestic liquidity conditions
13 
Difficulties in cross-border financing affected domestic liquidity conditions in EMEs through 
three channels. First, funding costs in domestic currency increased in several economies as 
the dislocation of the cross-border funding market prompted financial institutions to fund their 
US dollar borrowing through the FX swap market. Second, heightened counterparty risk 
affected borrowing in the interbank market (eg foreign banks were particularly affected). For 
example, market segmentation appears to have increased in some interbank markets, with 
some banks paying a higher average interest rate or facing reduced access to credit. Finally, 
there was a shortening in the maturity structure of banks’ funding.  
Of particular interest at the meeting was the impact of the crisis on interbank markets and on 
bond markets. 
                                                  
11   For further discussion of this topic and some references to central bank contributions, see Moreno and Villar 
(2010).  
12  In the immediate aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy there was also concern about the reduction in trade 
financing; this is reflected in the policy responses mentioned below. 
13  See BIS (2009) pp 117–30 for an analysis of the impact of the crisis on the liquidity of local interbank and 
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Impact on interbank markets. The crisis effectively shut down interbank markets for longer-
term funding in a number of economies, leaving only short-term interbank funding available.
14 
Nevertheless, questionnaire responses by central banks suggest that the impact of the crisis 
on secured and unsecured local currency lending between banks (where the central bank is 
not the counterparty) was generally limited. Few episodes of stress in the domestic interbank 
money markets were reported, particularly compared to those reported for the foreign 
exchange market. In one large EME, there was brief period during which liquidity problems 
arose in the domestic interbank market after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This 
reflected liquidity shortages rather than perceived counterparty risks and could be addressed 
without a change in monetary policy. While liquidity problems are generally linked to maturity 
transformation, some participants suggested that the impact is lessened if bank funding is 
from deposits rather than wholesale financing.  
Impact on government bond markets. In some EMEs, the effects on domestic bond 
markets were relatively limited. In Mexico, however, market uncertainty affecting foreign 
exchange markets (notably related to losses by firms on derivative positions) spilled over to 
domestic markets, leading to an increased demand for liquidity, massive withdrawals from 
mutual funds and sales of securities. This was associated with a sharp decline in demand for 
20- to 30-year government bonds. Many issuers could not place new securities. At the time 
of the meeting, markets were back to normal although liquidity conditions were not the same 
as before.
15 In another EME where bond markets are comparatively deep, concerns that 
foreign investors would sell their government bond positions led to a sharp widening in bid-
ask spreads that effectively stopped market activity. Authorities responded by offering repo 
lines with government bonds as collateral. 
4.   Central bank instruments in response to the crisis
16 
A wide range of tools were employed to deal with the crisis, notably measures taken to 
support foreign currency financing (eg lending from foreign reserves, foreign exchange 
auctions based on swap lines with other central banks) and domestic currency financing. 
Supporting foreign currency financing 
A number of countries implemented foreign exchange market operations to provide foreign 
currency, in some cases (eg Chile, Turkey) after discontinuing foreign reserve purchases. 
Foreign exchange market intervention took place in a variety of market segments (eg spot, 
forward, swaps or repos) that appeared to reflect perceptions of effectiveness or central bank 
balance sheet positions, and there was a tendency to increase duration (some transactions 
ranged from about one month to one year). Important considerations in providing support 
were to target certain priority sectors (eg trade finance, small enterprises), facilitate price 
                                                  
14   Individual country experiences varied. Fung and Yu (2010) provide empirical evidence showing that stress in 
US dollar money markets was rapidly transmitted to Hong Kong dollar money markets. In contrast, some other 
money markets experienced moderate or no effects (see for example Central Bank of Argentina (2010), 
Ibrahim (2010) or Bank of Thailand (2010)). See Babický (2010) and Sinha (2010) for additional experiences.  
15   See Sidaoui et al (2010) for a discussion of Mexico’s experience. 
16  For more on this topic, see Moreno (2010a), this volume and BIS (2009) pp 51–8. Country responses are 
discussed in a number of papers, eg Al-Hamidy (2010), Bank of Thailand (2010), Central Bank of Argentina 
(2010), Chung (2010), Guinigundo (2010), Ibrahim (2010), Mesquita and Toros (2010), People’s Bank of 
China (2010), Quispe and Rossini (2010), Sidaoui et al (2010), Sinha (2010), South African Reserve Bank 
(2010) and Yörükoğlu and Atasoy (2010). BIS Papers No 54  7
 
 
discovery (eg through the use of auctions) and economise on foreign reserves (eg via the 
use of swaps rather than outright sales).  
Most foreign exchange market intervention was financed by drawing on foreign reserves 
(only Korea also drew on the Federal Reserve swap facility persistently and on a relatively 
large scale).
17 Nevertheless, views differed on what the crisis revealed about the benefits and 
costs of foreign reserve accumulation. One view was that the benefits from accumulating 
international reserves were clearly shown to outweigh the costs. This was particularly so in 
the case of commodity (eg oil) exporters because of high volatility in export revenues. It was 
also noted that the standard indicator of foreign reserve cover for short-term external debt 
has shortcomings: it appeared to be adequate in some countries up to mid-2008, but a 
shortening of maturities by external lenders led to a sharp decline in this ratio, to below the 
100% Guidotti-Greenspan threshold in a few cases.  
Another view was that reserve holdings were in fact too high: the amount of foreign reserves 
used during the crisis was generally limited compared to the stock, and reserve hoarding is 
costly. Indeed, recently the high costs of sterilised intervention appear to have revived 
interest in capital controls.  
As for alternatives to foreign reserves, a number of countries had obtained access to the 
IMF’s Flexible Credit Line, but views differed about this alternative and possible stigma 
effects. One participant noted that US dollar swaps of central banks with the Federal 
Reserves helped maintain market confidence, consistent with some recent empirical 
evidence.
18 Indeed, such evidence more generally underscores the importance of policy 
responses in advanced economies in stabilising conditions in emerging market economies.
19 
Regional central bank cooperation was also seen as playing a role. Central banks in Asia 
and Latin America consulted frequently on conditions in foreign exchange markets. In Asia, a 
regional foreign exchange swap facility has been set up, drawing on a pool of foreign 
reserves. 
Supporting local currency financing 
A big difference from past crises is that many EMEs had more room to ease macroeconomic 
policies to counter a severe tightening of global financing conditions and an economic 
downturn. Thus, central banks changed their monetary operations or set up facilities 
(allowing for wider collateral or extending maturities eg via term lending facilities) to provide 
domestic currency financing. Some facilities were already in place and could be used 
immediately, which strengthened confidence in the private sector. 
There were also reductions in policy rates, which in some cases very large (eg from 8.25% to 
0.50% in Chile). However, as noted by Moreno (2010a), policy rate reductions in some 
countries took place after most of the market turmoil had passed, so they appeared intended 
to counter the sharp decline in aggregate demand in EMEs. The pass-through to bank 
lending rates was in many cases significant, although deposit rates in at least one instance 
reacted more quickly than loan rates, apparently because risk reassessment took some time. 
                                                  
17   Mexico drew on the Fed swap facility once, while the other two EMEs with access to Federal Reserve swap 
lines (Brazil and Singapore) did not draw on the funds. For further discussion of foreign reserves versus the 
alternatives, see Moreno (2010b) and Ong (2010). In some countries repatriation of capital by households 
helped stabilise the currency. 
18   See Stone et al (2009) and Baba and Shim (2010).  
19   See Baba and Packer (2009) and Goldberg et al (2010).  8  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Policy rate cuts tended to depreciate EME exchange rates, but in a number of cases this 
effect was more than offset by sharp declines in (extreme) risk aversion.  
Countries also responded by lowering reserve requirements; among the participants at the 
meeting, at least 10 countries changed reserve requirements in response to the crisis. In 
Brazil, lower reserve requirements were an important tool, especially to help small and 
medium-sized businesses.
20 
The need for appropriate institutional arrangements and the pace for exit strategies were 
also mentioned, as was the importance of transparency in implementing such strategies.  
Factors influencing policy responses and effectiveness
21 
A number of factors influencing policy responses and their effectiveness were cited. First, the 
duration and severity of stress, which in some cases was very brief or limited in its impact. It 
was also noted that increasing liquidity or lowering interest rates was more effective if the 
shock was largely from the real rather than the financial sector.  
Second, reduced vulnerabilities. These included no currency mismatches (attributed in part 
to floating exchange rates), regulatory measures taken to cool overheating economies before 
the crisis and sufficient or large international reserves.  
Third, consistency of economic policy, especially fiscal policy, which was seen as crucial for 
maintaining stability and allowing for countercyclical policies.  
Fourth,  effective communications. This posed challenges, as technical changes that may 
have been communicated in a way that was well understood by markets were not always 
easily understood by journalists. Some central banks hired public relations firms for this 
purpose.  
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